A dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment

• Verfasst von: Dominiak, Adam [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Dürsch, Peter [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Lefort, Jean-Philippe [VerfasserIn]
• Titel: A dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment
• Verf.angabe: Adam Dominiak, Peter Dürsch, and Jean-Philippe Lefort
• Verlagsort: Heidelberg
• Verlagsort: Heidelberg
• Verlag: Universitätsbibliothek der Universität Heidelberg
• Verlag: University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
• E-Jahr: 2009
• Jahr: September 2009
• Jahr: September 2009
• Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource
• Gesamttitel/Reihe: Discussion paper series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics ; no. 487
• Fussnoten: Online publiziert: 2009
• ComputerInfo: Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader.
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-opus-98286
• Datenträger: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: ger eng
• Sach-SW: Non expected utility preferences
• Sach-SW: ambiguity
• Sach-SW: updating
• Sach-SW: dynamic consistency
• Sach-SW: consequentialism
• Form-SW: Graue Literatur
• K10plus-PPN: 608488283
• K10plus-PPN:
  Universitätsbibliothek
• Lokale URL UB: Zum Volltext

Abstract

Two rationality arguments are used to justify the link between conditional and unconditional preferences in decision theory: dynamic consistency and consequentialism. Dynamic consistency requires that ex ante contingent choices are respected by updated preferences. Consequentialism states that only those outcomes which are still possible can matter for updated preferences. We test the descriptive validity of these rationality arguments with a dynamic version of Ellsberg's three color experiment and find that subjects act more often in line with consequentialism than with dynamic consistency.