Parliamentary scrutiny of the EU’s Common foreign and security policy

• Verfasst von: Herbel, Annika [VerfasserIn]
• Titel: Parliamentary scrutiny of the EU’s Common foreign and security policy
• Verf.angabe: Annika Herbel
• E-Jahr: 2016
• Jahr: 08 Nov 2016
• Umfang: 22 S.
• Fussnoten: Gesehen am 14.05.2018
• Titel Quelle: Enthalten in: West European politics
• Ort Quelle: Basingstoke [u.a.] : Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 1978
• Jahr Quelle: 2017
• Band/Heft Quelle: 40(2017), 1, Seite 161-182
• ISSN Quelle: 1743-9655
• DOI: doi:10.1080/01402382.2016.1240405
• Schlagwörter: (k)Europäische Union / (s)Mitgliedsstaaten / (s)Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik / (s)Internationale Organisation / (s)Entwicklung / (s)Politisches Mandat / (s)Parlament / (s)Kontrolle / (s)Überwachung / (s)Partei / (s)Politische Einstellung / (s)Internationaler Vergleich / (s)Tendenz
• Datenträger: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: eng
• Bibliogr. Hinweis: Erscheint auch als : Druck-Ausgabe: Herbel, Annika: Parliamentary scrutiny of the EU's common foreign and security policy. - 2017
• Sach-SW: CFSP
• Sach-SW: delegation
• Sach-SW: European Union
• Sach-SW: national parliaments
• Sach-SW: scrutiny
• K10plus-PPN: 1575017199

Abstract

This paper analyses under what conditions parties engage in parliamentary scrutiny of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. With insights from comparative literature on parliamentary oversight, two main incentives are identified. On the one hand, opposition parties initiate scrutiny to reduce their information asymmetry vis-à-vis the government; on the other hand, coalition parties use parliamentary scrutiny to control their partners. Empirically, the article uses information on scrutiny activities in six EU member states (Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, United Kingdom) covering 13 years and 21 governments. The findings suggest that opposition parties scrutinise the government if they have access to strong oversight instruments. In contrast, the strength of oversight instruments is not important for coalition partners. They resort to means of scrutiny if the leading minister is weak. Coalitions with a greater number of parties engage in scrutiny less often. Moreover, scrutiny is especially observed in questions with more direct distributional consequences (‘intermestic’ issues).