Navigation überspringen
Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg
Status: Bibliographieeintrag

Verfügbarkeit
Standort: ---
Exemplare: ---

+ Andere Auflagen/Ausgaben
heiBIB
 Online-Ressource
Verfasst von:Goeschl, Timo [VerfasserIn]   i
 Jarke, Johannes Stephan [VerfasserIn]   i
Titel:Trust, but verify?
Titelzusatz:monitoring, inspection costs, and opportunism under limited observability
Verf.angabe:Timo Goeschl, Johannes Jarke
E-Jahr:2017
Jahr:12 August 2017
Umfang:11 S.
Fussnoten:Gesehen am 13.09.2018
Titel Quelle:Enthalten in: Journal of economic behavior & organization
Ort Quelle:Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1980
Jahr Quelle:2017
Band/Heft Quelle:142(2017), Seite 320-330
ISSN Quelle:1879-1751
 0167-2681
Abstract:Is feedback on trustworthiness necessary for the functioning of economic relationships? In many real-world economic environments, such feedback can at best be acquired through costly monitoring, raising questions of how trust and efficiency can be maintained. In the lab, we conduct a modified finite-horizon binary trust game in which we vary the observability of the trustee's actions. In the baseline condition, trustors can perfectly observe their trustee's actions. We compare this to a condition in which that actions are unobservable and three conditions in which they must be actively monitored, at zero, low or high cost, respectively. Counter-intuitively, differences in observability do not lead to significant differences in trust and efficiency, but the levels are supported by very different information structures: while trustors monitored every action under zero observation costs, most of trusting actions were “blind” - trustors did not learn whether their trust was honored or not - under costly monitoring. Even under complete unobservability almost half of the available surplus was realized. There are distributive impacts, however: the gains from trust favor trustees under the more adverse informational conditions. The behavioral patterns are consistent with the fact that trustors’ beliefs about their trustee's conduct are almost invariant across conditions.
DOI:doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.028
URL:Bitte beachten Sie: Dies ist ein Bibliographieeintrag. Ein Volltextzugriff für Mitglieder der Universität besteht hier nur, falls für die entsprechende Zeitschrift/den entsprechenden Sammelband ein Abonnement besteht oder es sich um einen OpenAccess-Titel handelt.

Volltext ; Verlag: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.028
 Volltext: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268117302068
 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.028
Datenträger:Online-Ressource
Sprache:eng
Bibliogr. Hinweis:Erscheint auch als : Druck-Ausgabe: Goeschl, Timo, 1970 - : Trust, but verify?. - 2017
Sach-SW:Cooperation
 Laboratory experiment
 Monitoring
 Repeated game
 Social dilemma
 Trust
K10plus-PPN:1580939740
Verknüpfungen:→ Zeitschrift

Permanenter Link auf diesen Titel (bookmarkfähig):  https://katalog.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/titel/68304739   QR-Code
zum Seitenanfang