Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games

• Verfasst von: Dürsch, Peter [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Oechssler, Joerg [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Schipper, Burkhard [VerfasserIn]
• Titel: Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games
• Verf.angabe: Peter Duersch, Jörg Oechssler, Burkhard C. Schipper
• E-Jahr: 2012
• Jahr: August 2012
• Umfang: 12 S.
• Fussnoten: Gesehen am 29.11.2018 ; First online: 15 September 2011
• Titel Quelle: Enthalten in: International journal of game theory
• Ort Quelle: Berlin : Springer, 1971
• Jahr Quelle: 2012
• Band/Heft Quelle: 41(2012), 3, Seite 553-564
• ISSN Quelle: 1432-1270
• DOI: doi:10.1007/s00182-011-0302-x
• Datenträger: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: eng
• Bibliogr. Hinweis: Erscheint auch als : Druck-Ausgabe: Dürsch, Peter: Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games. - 2012
• K10plus-PPN: 1584629630

Abstract

We observe that a symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors matrix. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure equilibrium. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. Our findings extend to general two-player zero-sum games using the symmetrization of zero-sum games due to von Neumann. We point out that the class of symmetric twoplayer zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of finite population evolutionary stable strategies.