A test of information aversion

• Verfasst von: Kops, Christopher [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Pasichnichenko, Illia [VerfasserIn]
• Titel: A test of information aversion
• Verf.angabe: Christopher Kops and Illia Pasichnichenko
• Verlagsort: Heidelberg
• Verlag: University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
• E-Jahr: 2020
• Jahr: April 2020
• Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (29 Seiten)
• Illustrationen: Illustrationen
• Gesamttitel/Reihe: Discussion paper series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics ; no. 682
• Fussnoten: JEL codes: D81, D83, D90, Keywords: Value of Information, Ambiguity Aversion, Ellsberg paradox, Ellsberg urn
• DOI: doi:10.11588/heidok.00028244
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-282444
• Datenträger: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: eng
• Bibliogr. Hinweis: Forschungsdaten: Kops, Christopher: A test of information aversion
• Sach-SW: Value of Information
• Sach-SW: Ambiguity Aversion
• Sach-SW: Ellsberg paradox
• Sach-SW: Ellsberg urn
• Form-SW: Graue Literatur
• K10plus-PPN: 1695844114
• K10plus-PPN:
  Universitätsbibliothek
• Lokale URL UB: Zum Volltext

Abstract

The standard Bayesian model implies that information can never have a negative value. We put this implication to the proof. Our paper provides the first test of the value (positive or negative) of information under uncertainty. We show that the "Bayesian implication" stands in conflict with the information-averse behavior that is revealed in our experiment. This behavior demonstrates that the value of truthful and unambiguous information may indeed be negative. Our findings complement predictions from recent theoretical work in showing that negative value of information correlates with ambiguity aversion. This highlights the importance of counseling for decision-making under uncertainty.