Politics and IMF conditionality

• Verfasst von: Dreher, Axel [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Sturm, Jan-Egbert [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Vreeland, James Raymond [VerfasserIn]
• Titel: Politics and IMF conditionality
• Titelzusatz: $hAxel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James Raymond Vreeland
• Jahr: 2015
• Jahr des Originals: 2013
• Umfang: 29 S.
• Fussnoten: First published: September 11, 2013 ; Gesehen am 29.06.2020
• Titel Quelle: Enthalten in: The journal of conflict resolution
• Ort Quelle: Thousand Oaks, Calif. [u.a.] : Sage Publications, 1957
• Jahr Quelle: 2015
• Band/Heft Quelle: 59(2015), 1, Seite 120-148
• ISSN Quelle: 1552-8766
• DOI: doi:10.1177/0022002713499723
• Schlagwörter: (k)Internationaler Währungsfonds / (k)Vereinte Nationen / (s)Anleihe / (s)Kredit / (s)Konditionalität / (s)Bedeutung / (s)Rolle / (s)Internationales politisches System / (s)Position / (s)Internationale Organisation / (s)Mitwirkung / (s)Statistische Analyse / (g)Erde
• Datenträger: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: eng
• Bibliogr. Hinweis: Erscheint auch als : Druck-Ausgabe: Dreher, Axel, 1972 - : Politics and IMF conditionality. - 2015
• K10plus-PPN: 170284708X

Abstract

Bailouts sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are famous for their conditionality: in return for continued installments of desperately needed loans, governments must comply with austere policy changes. Many have suggested, however, that politically important countries face rather weak stringency. Obstacles to testing this hypothesis include finding a measure of political importance that is not plagued by endogeneity and obtaining data on IMF conditionality. We propose to measure political importance using temporary membership on the UN Security Council and analyze a newly available data set on the level of conditionality attached to (a maximum of) 314 IMF arrangements with 101 countries over the 1992–2008 period. We find a negative relationship: Security Council members receive about 30 percent fewer conditions. This suggests that the major shareholders of the IMF trade softer conditionality in return for political influence over the Security Council.