When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?

• Verfasst von: Dürsch, Peter [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Oechssler, Joerg [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Schipper, Burkhard [VerfasserIn]
• Titel: When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?
• Verf.angabe: Peter Duersch · Jörg Oechssler · Burkhard C. Schipper
• Jahr: 2014
• Jahr des Originals: 2013
• Umfang: 12 S.
• Fussnoten: Published online: 7 March 2013 ; Gesehen am 09.10.2020
• Titel Quelle: Enthalten in: International journal of game theory
• Ort Quelle: Berlin : Springer, 1971
• Jahr Quelle: 2014
• Band/Heft Quelle: 43(2014), 1, Seite 25-36
• ISSN Quelle: 1432-1270
• DOI: doi:10.1007/s00182-013-0370-1
• Datenträger: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: eng
• Bibliogr. Hinweis: Erscheint auch als : Druck-Ausgabe: Dürsch, Peter: When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?. - 2014
• Sach-SW: Imitation
• Sach-SW: Tit-for-tat
• Sach-SW: Decision rules
• Sach-SW: Learning
• Sach-SW: Exact potential games
• Sach-SW: Symmetric games
• Sach-SW: Repeated games
• Sach-SW: Relative payoffs
• Sach-SW: Zero-sum games
• K10plus-PPN: 1735240885

Abstract

We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but also imitate-the-best and imitate-if-better. Every decision rule in this class is essentially unbeatable in exact potential games. Our results apply to many interesting games including all symmetric 2$$\times