The appearance of corruption

• Verfasst von: Shaw, Daron R. [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Roberts, Brian Evans [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Baek, Mijeong [VerfasserIn]
• Titel: The appearance of corruption
• Titelzusatz: testing the Supreme Court's assumptions about campaign finance reform
• Verf.angabe: Daron R. Shaw, Brian E. Roberts, and Mijeong Baek
• Verlagsort: New York, NY
• Verlag: Oxford University Press
• Jahr: 2021
• Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource
• Gesamttitel/Reihe: Oxford scholarship online : Political Science
• ISBN: 978-0-19-755039-7
• DOI: doi:10.1093/oso/9780197548417.001.0001
• Datenträger: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: eng
• Bibliogr. Hinweis: Erscheint auch als : Druck-Ausgabe
• Sach-SW: United States ; Supreme Court
• Sach-SW: Campaign funds ; Law and legislation ; United States
• Sach-SW: Campaign funds ; Corrupt practices ; United States
• Sach-SW: Elections ; Corrupt practices ; United States
• Sach-SW: Political corruption ; United States
• K10plus-PPN: 1750170388
• K10plus-PPN:
  Universitätsbibliothek
• Lokale URL UB: Zum Volltext

Abstract

In Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the US Supreme Court famously upheld the constitutionality of legislation limiting individual campaign contributions in federal elections. Key to the Court's decision is the notion that the government has a compelling interest in reducing 'the appearance of corruption.' By reducing the public's belief that elected officials are corrupt, the Court argues, we will see increased trust in government and, thereby, increased political participation. This behavioural model is unique in Supreme Court jurisprudence, yet has never been subjected to systematic empirical verification. This book identifies and tests the model with several national surveys. The data refute many of the linkages assumed by the Court, raising questions about the legal foundation for limiting political speech in federal election campaigns.

Abstract

"The sanctity of political speech is a key element of the U.S. Constitution and a cornerstone of the American republic. When the Supreme Court linked political speech to campaign finance in its landmark Buckley v. Valeo (1976) decision, the modern era of campaign finance regulation was born. In practical terms, this decision meant that in order to pass constitutional muster, any laws limiting money in politics must be narrowly-tailored and serve a compelling state interest. The lone state interest the Court was willing to entertain was the mitigation of corruption. In order to reach this argument the Court advanced a sophisticated behavioral model, one with key assumptions about how laws will affect voters' opinions and behavior. These assumptions have received surprisingly little attention in the literature. This book takes up the task of identifying and analyzing empirically the Court's presumed links between campaign finance regulations and political opinions and behavior. In so doing, we rely on original survey data and experiments from 2009-2016 to openly confront the question of what happens when the Supreme Court is wrong, and when the foundation of over 40 years of jurisprudence is simply not true"--