Competitive vs. random audit mechanisms in environmental regulation

• Verfasst von: Goeschl, Timo [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Oestreich, Marcel [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Soldà, Alice [VerfasserIn]
• Titel: Competitive vs. random audit mechanisms in environmental regulation
• Titelzusatz: emissions, self-reporting, and the role of peer information
• Verf.angabe: Timo Goeschl, Marcel Oestreich, Alice Soldà
• Ausgabe: This version: 11 Mrz. 2021
• Verlagsort: Heidelberg
• Verlag: Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg
• E-Jahr: 2021
• Jahr: [2021]
• Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (29 Seiten)
• Illustrationen: Illustrationen
• Gesamttitel/Reihe: AWI discussion paper series ; no. 699 (March 2021)
• DOI: doi:10.11588/heidok.00029474
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-294749
• Datenträger: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: eng
• Sach-SW: environmental regulation
• Sach-SW: regulatory compliance
• Sach-SW: tournament theory
• Sach-SW: mechanism design
• Sach-SW: Laboratory experiment
• Form-SW: Graue Literatur
• K10plus-PPN: 1751345769
• K10plus-PPN:
  Universitätsbibliothek
• Lokale URL UB: Zum Volltext

Abstract

In a simplifying analytical framework with endogenous levels of actual and self-reported emissions, we consolidate the existing literature into three main hypotheses about the relative merits, for a resource-constrained regulator, of random (RAM) and competitive (CAM) audit mechanisms in the presence or absence of peer information about actual emissions. Testing the three hypotheses in a quasi-laboratory experiment (N = 131), we find supportive evidence that CAM always induce more truthful reporting than RAM. Moreover, we provide the empirical validation of the theoretical prediction that CAM can succeed in aligning actual emissions more closely with the social optimum in the presence of peer information when RAM cannot. Behavioral mechanisms prevent reaching the first-best outcome.