Beyond the fallacy of coup-ism

• Verfasst von: Croissant, Aurel [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Kühn, David [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Chambers, Paul W. [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Wolf, Siegfried O. [VerfasserIn]
• Titel: Beyond the fallacy of coup-ism
• Titelzusatz: conceptualizing civilian control of the military in emerging democracies
• Verf.angabe: Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, Paul Chambers & Siegfried O. Wolf
• E-Jahr: 2010
• Jahr: 05 Oct 2010.
• Umfang: 26 S.
• Fussnoten: Gesehen am 19.03.2021
• Titel Quelle: Enthalten in: Democratization
• Ort Quelle: Ilford, Essex : Cass, 1994
• Jahr Quelle: 2010
• Band/Heft Quelle: 17(2010), 5, Seite 950-975
• ISSN Quelle: 1743-890X
• DOI: doi:10.1080/13510347.2010.501180
• Schlagwörter: (s)Demokratie / (s)Demokratisierung / (s)Militär / (s)Regierung / (s)Partei
• Datenträger: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: eng
• Bibliogr. Hinweis: Erscheint auch als : Druck-Ausgabe: Beyond the fallacy of coup-ism. - 2010
• Sach-SW: armed forces
• Sach-SW: civil-military relations
• Sach-SW: civilian control
• Sach-SW: democracy
• Sach-SW: democracy theory
• Sach-SW: democratic consolidation
• Sach-SW: democratization
• Sach-SW: military
• Sach-SW: new democracies
• K10plus-PPN: 1751854507

Abstract

It is consensus in the democratization literature that civilian control of the military is a necessary ingredient for democracy and democratic consolidation. However, there is considerable disagreement on what civilian control of the military exactly entails and there is a lack of solid theoretical arguments for how weak or absent civilian control affects democratic governance. Furthermore, a considerable portion of the research literature is captured by the fallacy of coup-ism, ignoring the many other forms in which military officers can constrain the authority of democratically elected political leaders to make political decisions and get them implemented. This article addresses these lacunae by providing a new conceptual framework for the analysis of civil-military relations in emerging democracies. From democracy theory it derives a definition of civilian control as a certain distribution of decision-making power between civilian leaders and military officers. Based on this definition, the authors develop a five-dimensional concept of civilian control, discuss the effects of weakly institutionalized civilian control on the quality of democracy and address the chances for democratic consolidation.