A diffusion model analysis of belief bias

• Verfasst von: Schubert, Anna-Lena [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Ferreira, Mário B. [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Mata, André [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Riemenschneider, Ben [VerfasserIn]
• Titel: A diffusion model analysis of belief bias
• Titelzusatz: different cognitive mechanisms explain how cognitive abilities and thinking styles contribute to conflict resolution in reasoning
• Verf.angabe: Anna-Lena Schubert, Mário B. Ferreira, André Mata, Ben Riemenschneider
• E-Jahr: 2021
• Jahr: 21 February 2021
• Umfang: 17 S.
• Teil: volume:211
• Teil: year:2021
• Teil: month:06
• Teil: elocationid:104629
• Teil: pages:1-17
• Teil: extent:17
• Fussnoten: Gesehen am 16.06.2021
• Titel Quelle: Enthalten in: Cognition
• Ort Quelle: Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1972
• Jahr Quelle: 2021
• Band/Heft Quelle: 211(2021) vom: Juni, Artikel-ID 104629, Seite 1-17
• ISSN Quelle: 1873-7838
• DOI: doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104629
• Datenträger: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: eng
• Sach-SW: Belief bias
• Sach-SW: Cognitive abilities
• Sach-SW: Diffusion model
• Sach-SW: Individual differences
• Sach-SW: Reasoning
• K10plus-PPN: 1760544019

Abstract

Recent results have challenged the widespread assumption of dual process models of belief bias that sound reasoning relies on slow, careful reflection, whereas biased reasoning is based on fast intuition. Instead, parallel process models of reasoning suggest that rule- and belief-based problem features are processed in parallel and that reasoning problems that elicit a conflict between rule- and belief-based problem features may also elicit more than one Type 1 response. This has important implications for individual-differences research on reasoning, because rule-based responses by certain individuals may reflect that these individuals were either more likely to give a rule-based default response or that they successfully inhibited and overrode a belief-based default response. In two studies, we used the diffusion model to describe decision making in a transitive reasoning task. In Study 1, 41 participants were asked to evaluate conclusions based on their validity. In Study 2, 133 participants evaluated conclusions based on their validity or believability. We tested which diffusion model parameters reflected conflict resolution and related those model parameters to individual differences in cognitive abilities and thinking styles. Individual differences in need for cognition predicted successful conflict resolution under logic instruction, which suggests that a disposition to engage in reflective thinking facilitates the inhibition and override of Type 1 responses. Intelligence, however, was negatively related to successful conflict resolution under belief instruction, which suggests that individuals with high cognitive abilities quickly generated a higher-level logical response that interfered with their ability to evaluate lower-level intrinsic problem features. Taken together, this double dissociation indicates that cognitive abilities and thinking styles affect the processing of conflict information through different mechanisms and at different stages: Greater cognitive abilities facilitate the efficient creation of decoupled problem representations, whereas a greater disposition to engage in critical thinking facilitates the detection and override of Type 1 responses.