Games in context

• Verfasst von: Dominiak, Adam [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Eichberger, Jürgen [VerfasserIn]
• Titel: Games in context
• Titelzusatz: equilibrium under ambiguity for belief functions
• Verf.angabe: Adam Dominiak, Jürgen Eichberger
• E-Jahr: 2021
• Jahr: 21 April 2021
• Umfang: 35 S.
• Teil: volume:128
• Teil: year:2021
• Teil: month:07
• Teil: pages:125-159
• Teil: extent:35
• Fussnoten: Available online 21 April 2021 ; Gesehen am 19.07.2021
• Titel Quelle: Enthalten in: Games and economic behavior
• Ort Quelle: Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1989
• Jahr Quelle: 2021
• Band/Heft Quelle: 128(2021) vom: Juli, Seite 125-159
• ISSN Quelle: 1090-2473
• DOI: doi:10.1016/j.geb.2021.04.002
• Datenträger: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: eng
• Sach-SW: Belief functions
• Sach-SW: Choquet expected utility
• Sach-SW: Context information
• Sach-SW: Equilibrium under ambiguity
• Sach-SW: Non-additive beliefs
• Sach-SW: Optimism and pessimism
• Sach-SW: Strategic games
• K10plus-PPN: 1763180034

Abstract

We propose a new solution concept, called Context-Dependent Equilibrium Under Ambiguity (CD-EUA), for strategic games where players' beliefs may be influenced by exogenous context-related information. Players' beliefs about the strategic behavior of their opponents are represented by belief functions. The notion of belief functions allows us to combine exogenous context information in the spirit of Schelling (1960) with endogenous equilibrium beliefs about the opponents' behavior in analogy to the standard Nash equilibrium. For any finite strategic game, we prove existence of a CD-EUA for any context information and any degree of confidence in it. Moreover, we show continuity of the equilibrium correspondence. Finally, we illustrate how CD-EUA can be applied to different types of context information in games by explaining some stylized facts from experimental research on coordination.