Safety, sensitivity and “distant” epistemic luck

• Verfasst von: Freitag, Wolfgang [VerfasserIn]
• Titel: Safety, sensitivity and “distant” epistemic luck
• Verf.angabe: by Wolfgang Freitag
• Jahr: 2014
• Umfang: 18 S.
• Teil: volume:80
• Teil: year:2014
• Teil: number:1
• Teil: pages:44-61
• Teil: extent:18
• Fussnoten: First published: 03 April 2013 ; Gesehen am 27.09.2021
• Titel Quelle: Enthalten in: Theoria <Stockholm>
• Ort Quelle: Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley-Blackwell, 1935
• Jahr Quelle: 2014
• Band/Heft Quelle: 80(2014), 1, Seite 44-61
• ISSN Quelle: 1755-2567
• DOI: doi:10.1111/theo.12011
• Datenträger: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: eng
• Sach-SW: epistemic luck
• Sach-SW: Gettier example
• Sach-SW: safety
• Sach-SW: sensitivity
• K10plus-PPN: 1771844205

Abstract

Prominent instances of anti-luck epistemology, in particular sensitivity and safety accounts of knowledge, introduce a modal condition on the pertinent belief in terms of closeness or similarity of possible worlds. Very roughly speaking, a belief must continue to be true in close possibilities in order to qualify as knowledge. Such closeness-accounts derive much support from their (alleged) ability to eliminate standard instances of epistemic luck as they appear in prominent Gettier-type examples. The article argues that there are new Gettier-type examples which are grounded in “distant” epistemic luck. It is demonstrated that sensitivity and safety theories cannot handle such examples.