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Verfasst von:Schredl, Michael [VerfasserIn]   i
Titel:Being naked in dreams
Titelzusatz:analysis of a long dream series
Verf.angabe:Michael Schredl
E-Jahr:2021
Jahr:2021-10-31
Umfang:5 S.
Fussnoten:Gesehen am 02.11.2021
Titel Quelle:Enthalten in: International journal of dream research
Ort Quelle:Heidelberg : Univ.-Bibliothek, 2008
Jahr Quelle:2021
Band/Heft Quelle:14(2021), 2, Seite 327-331
ISSN Quelle:1866-7953
Abstract:Some theorists claimed that dreams show mainly features of primary consciousness but lack the characteristics of secondary consciousness like self-reflection, abstract thinking, and metacognition. One approach to this question is to study dreams in which the basic pattern of the dream involves higher-order consciousness processing. In a dream series of 12,159 dreams, the topic of “being totally or partially nude” was analyzed since the associated shame/embarrassment is a result of the dreamer’s worries about what others might think of him or her (theory of mind). About 1.08% of the dreams included this topic, showing a large variability regarding the content. Overall, the findings offered strong support against the views that dreams are single-minded or mainly characterized by primary consciousness processes. Studying typical dreams that include − almost per definition − secondary consciousness processes is a promising approach toward clarifying the cognitive capabilities within dreams.
DOI:doi:10.11588/ijodr.2021.2.82663
URL:kostenfrei: Volltext: https://dx.doi.org/10.11588/ijodr.2021.2.82663
 kostenfrei: Volltext: https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/IJoDR/article/view/82663
 DOI: https://doi.org/10.11588/ijodr.2021.2.82663
Datenträger:Online-Ressource
Sprache:eng
Sach-SW:Secondary consciousness
K10plus-PPN:1775892387
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