Embodiment and personal identity in dementia

• Verfasst von: Fuchs, Thomas [VerfasserIn]
• Titel: Embodiment and personal identity in dementia
• Verf.angabe: Thomas Fuchs
• E-Jahr: 2020
• Jahr: 31 August 2020
• Umfang: 12 S.
• Fussnoten: Gesehen am 09.12.2021
• Titel Quelle: Enthalten in: Medicine, health care and philosophy
• Ort Quelle: Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V, 1998
• Jahr Quelle: 2020
• Band/Heft Quelle: 23(2020), 4, Seite 665-676
• ISSN Quelle: 1572-8633
• DOI: doi:10.1007/s11019-020-09973-0
• Datenträger: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: eng
• K10plus-PPN: 1780868235
• K10plus-PPN:
  Universitätsbibliothek
• Lokale URL UB: Zum Volltext

Abstract

Theories of personal identity in the tradition of John Locke and Derek Parfit emphasize the importance of psychological continuity and the abilities to think, to remember and to make rational choices as a basic criterion for personhood. As a consequence, persons with severe dementia are threatened to lose the status of persons. Such concepts, however, are situated within a dualistic framework, in which the body is regarded as a mere vehicle of the person, or a carrier of the brain as the organ of mental faculties. Based on the phenomenology of embodiment, this paper elaborates a different approach to personal identity in dementia. In this perspective, selfhood is primarily constituted by pre-reflective self-awareness and the body memory of an individual, which consists in the embodiment and enactment of familiar habits, practices and preferences. After describing the different types of body memory, the paper develops a phenomenology of dementia as a loss of reflexivity and meta-perspective. This is contrasted with the preservation of individual forms of body memory even in the later stages of the illness. The ethical consequences of an embodied approach to dementia are outlined. A final look is given to narrativistic and constructionist concepts of the self in dementia.