Subsidizing quantity donations

• Verfasst von: Diederich, Johannes [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Eckel, Catherine C. [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Epperson, Raphael [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Goeschl, Timo [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Grossman, Philip Johnson [VerfasserIn]
• Titel: Subsidizing quantity donations
• Titelzusatz: matches, rebates, and discounts compared
• Verf.angabe: Johannes Diederich, Catherine C. Eckel, Raphael Epperson, Timo Goeschl, Philip J. Grossman
• Ausgabe: This version: November 22, 2018
• Verlagsort: [Leipzig]
• Verlag: Verein für Socialpolitik
• Jahr: 2019
• Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten)
• Illustrationen: Illustrationen
• Gesamttitel/Reihe: Jahrestagung 2019 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; no. C14-V1 : C14, Session: Public Economics III ; V1
• Datenträger: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: eng
• Sach-SW: Charitable giving
• Sach-SW: subsidies
• Sach-SW: online field experiment
• Sach-SW: framing
• Form-SW: Kongressbeitrag
• Form-SW: Graue Literatur
• K10plus-PPN: 1741323177

Abstract

We present online-experimental evidence that challenges the generalizability of established results on subsidizing giving by considering a "quantity donation" scheme. We define this scheme as one in which donors choose how many units of a charitable good to fund, rather than the amount of money to give. We find that different subsidy types are equally effective in raising funds. This contrasts with the common result of matches being superior to rebates. The finding masks a higher likelihood of giving under rebates and larger donations under matches and discounts. Our results emphasize the role of small changes in the donation environment.