Political stability and fiscal policy

• Verfasst von: Feld, Lars P.
• Verfasst von: Schaltegger, Christoph A.
• Titel: Political stability and fiscal policy
• Titelzusatz: time series evidence for the Swiss federal level since 1849
• Verf.angabe: Lars P. Feld; Christoph A. Schaltegger
• Verlagsort: München
• Verlag: CESifo
• Jahr: 2009
• Umfang: Online-Ressource (34 S.)
• Illustrationen: Ill., graph. Darst.
• Gesamttitel/Reihe: CESifo working paper ; 2691 : Public finance
• Schlagwörter: (g)Schweiz / (s)Finanzpolitik / (z)Geschichte 1849-2009
• Datenträger: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: eng
• Bibliogr. Hinweis: Erscheint auch als : Druck-Ausgabe: Feld, Lars P., 1966 - : Political stability and fiscal policy time series evidence for the Swiss federal level since 1849. - Munich : Univ., Center for Economic Studies, 2009. - 34 S.
• Form-SW: Arbeitspapier
• Form-SW: Graue Literatur
• Form-SW: Buch
• Form-SW: Online-Publikation
• Form-SW: Als Aufsatz endgültig erschienen
• K10plus-PPN: 604525354

Abstract

This paper explores the role of political stability on fiscal policy choices in a time-series analysis over 158 years on the Swiss federal level. We argue that the fiscal-commons problem of public finances is affected by the time-horizon of a finance minister. Arguably, the incentives for an incumbent to maintain a good reputation with sound policy decisions are stronger the longer the time-horizon of a respective term. In addition, a finance minister who succeeds to stay a long time in office normally enjoys a politically powerful position towards the parliament, the administration and the interest groups to influence policy decisions. In contrast, frequent government turnover weakens the position of the finance minister. -- political stability ; fiscal policy ; constitutional changes