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| Verfasst von: | Diekert, Florian [VerfasserIn]  |
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| | Eymess, Tillmann [VerfasserIn] |
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| | Luomba, Joseph [VerfasserIn] |
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| | Waichman, Israel [VerfasserIn] |
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| Titel: | The creation of social norms under weak institutions |
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| Verf.angabe: | Florian Diekert, Tillmann Eymess, Joseph Luomba, and Israel Waichman |
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| E-Jahr: | 2022 |
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| Jahr: | September 08, 2022 |
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| Umfang: | 34 S. |
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| Fussnoten: | Gesehen am 18.10.2022 |
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| Titel Quelle: | Enthalten in: Association of Environmental and Resource EconomistsJournal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists |
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| Ort Quelle: | Chicago, IL : University of Chicago Press, 2014 |
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| Jahr Quelle: | 2022 |
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| Band/Heft Quelle: | 9(2022), 6 vom: Nov., Seite 1127-1160 |
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| ISSN Quelle: | 2333-5963 |
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| Abstract: | Formal regulations often fail to ensure sustainable management of natural resources. An alternative approach could rely on the interaction of norm-based interventions and social sanctions. Our lab-in-the-field experiment with fishermen at Lake Victoria studies how a norm-based intervention, namely, social information about high or low levels of previous cooperation, affects behavior and beliefs in a prisoner’s dilemma game with or without weak social sanctioning. Providing different social information succeeds in creating different norms of cooperation, but only if sanctioning is possible: cooperation rates start at a high level and stay at a high level when social information emphasizes cooperation but start at a low level and stay at a low level when social information emphasizes defection. Without social sanctioning, cooperation rates decline, irrespective of the social information. Particularly participants with close connection to others in their experimental session conform to the behavior that is emphasized by the social information message under sanctioning. |
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| DOI: | doi:10.1086/720287 |
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| URL: | Bitte beachten Sie: Dies ist ein Bibliographieeintrag. Ein Volltextzugriff für Mitglieder der Universität besteht hier nur, falls für die entsprechende Zeitschrift/den entsprechenden Sammelband ein Abonnement besteht oder es sich um einen OpenAccess-Titel handelt.
Verlag: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/720287 |
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| | Resolving-System: https://doi.org/10.1086/720287 |
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| | Verlag: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/720287 |
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| | Supplemental: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/suppl/10.1086/720287/suppl_file/2021062Appendix.pdf |
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| | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/720287 |
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| Datenträger: | Online-Ressource |
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| Sprache: | eng |
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| Bibliogr. Hinweis: | Forschungsdaten: Diekert, Florian, 1981 - : The creation of social norms under weak institutions [data and replication package] |
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| Sach-SW: | collective action |
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| | common pool resources |
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| | lab-in-the-field experiment |
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| | social norms |
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| | C72 |
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| | C93 |
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| | collective action |
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| | common pool resources |
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| | D7 |
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| | lab-in-the-field experiment |
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| | Q22 |
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| | social norms |
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| Form-SW: | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift |
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| K10plus-PPN: | 1817172026 |
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| Verknüpfungen: | → Zeitschrift |
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¬The¬ creation of social norms under weak institutions / Diekert, Florian [VerfasserIn]; September 08, 2022 (Online-Ressource)
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