Closure and the lottery

• Verfasst von: Dierig, Simon [VerfasserIn]
• Titel: Closure and the lottery
• Verf.angabe: Simon Dierig (University of Heidelberg)
• E-Jahr: 2022
• Jahr: 04 Nov 2022
• Umfang: 15 S.
• Fussnoten: Gesehen am 23.11.2022
• Titel Quelle: Enthalten in: Grazer philosophische Studien
• Ort Quelle: Leiden : Brill Rodopi, 1975
• Jahr Quelle: 2022
• Band/Heft Quelle: (2022), Seite 1-15
• ISSN Quelle: 1875-6735
• DOI: doi:10.1163/18756735-00000170
• Datenträger: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: eng
• Sach-SW: closure
• Sach-SW: epistemology
• Sach-SW: knowledge
• Sach-SW: lottery paradox
• K10plus-PPN: 1823266541

Abstract

Abstract Ever since Fred Dretske (1970) questioned closure, a denial of this principle has been among the standard options for a resolution of epistemological paradoxes such as the skeptical paradox (Cohen 1988) and the lottery paradox (Harman 1973). In this article, the author shall argue that all possible solutions of the latter paradox can only be defended if Multi-Premise Closure is rejected. These possible solutions are contextualism and both simple and sensitive moderate invariantism. It will be shown that skepticism and the denial of Single-Premise Closure are not possible solutions of the lottery paradox. The upshot of the discussion here will be that while Single-Premise Closure is beyond reasonable doubt, resolving the lottery paradox forces one to abandon Multi-Premise Closure.