Political stability and fiscal policy

• Verfasst von: Feld, Lars P. [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Schaltegger, Christoph A. [VerfasserIn]
• Titel: Political stability and fiscal policy
• Titelzusatz: time series evidence for the Swiss federal level since 1849
• Verf.angabe: Lars P. Feld, Christoph A. Schaltegger
• E-Jahr: 2010
• Jahr: 9 July 2010
• Umfang: 30 S.
• Fussnoten: Gesehen am 12.06.2023
• Titel Quelle: Enthalten in: Public choice
• Ort Quelle: New York, NY : Springer Science+Business Media LLC, 1968
• Jahr Quelle: 2010
• Band/Heft Quelle: 144(2010), 3, Seite 505-534
• ISSN Quelle: 1573-7101
• DOI: doi:10.1007/s11127-010-9677-7
• Datenträger: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: eng
• Sach-SW: Constitutional changes
• Sach-SW: D78
• Sach-SW: Fiscal policy
• Sach-SW: H11
• Sach-SW: H50
• Sach-SW: H61
• Sach-SW: Political stability
• Sach-SW: Strong finance minister
• K10plus-PPN: 1848780559

Abstract

This paper explores the role of political stability on fiscal policy in a time-series analysis over 158 years at the Swiss federal level. We argue that the fiscal commons problem of public finances is affected by the number of years a finance minister remains in office, because the incentives for an incumbent to maintain a good reputation with sound policy decisions are stronger. A finance minister who succeeds to stay a long time in office enjoys a politically powerful position towards the administration, parliament and interest groups. In contrast, frequent government turnover weakens the position of the finance minister.