Partner selection in public goods experiments

• Verfasst von: Coricelli, Giorgio [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Fehr, Dietmar [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Fellner, Gerlinde [VerfasserIn]
• Titel: Partner selection in public goods experiments
• Verf.angabe: Giorgio Coricelli, Dietmar Fehr, Gerlinde Fellner
• E-Jahr: 2004
• Jahr: June 2004
• Umfang: 23 S.
• Fussnoten: Gesehen am 26.06.2023
• Titel Quelle: Enthalten in: The journal of conflict resolution
• Ort Quelle: Thousand Oaks, Calif. [u.a.] : Sage Publications, 1957
• Jahr Quelle: 2004
• Band/Heft Quelle: 48(2004), 3, Seite 356-378
• ISSN Quelle: 1552-8766
• DOI: doi:10.1177/0022002704264143
• Datenträger: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: eng
• K10plus-PPN: 185095979X

Abstract

The effect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good is examined. Participants are in six sequences of five rounds of a two-person public good game in partner design. At the end of each sequence, they can select a new partner out of six group members. Unidirectional and bidirectional partner selection mechanisms are introduced and compared to controls with random partner rematching. Results demonstrate significantly higher cooperation in correspondence to unidirectional partner selection than to bidirectional selection and random rematching. Average monetary effort for being able to choose a partner is substantially high and remains stable.