Making punches count

• Verfasst von: Batto, Nathan F. [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Beaulieu, Emily [VerfasserIn]
• Titel: Making punches count
• Titelzusatz: the individual logic of legislative brawls
• Verf.angabe: Nathan F. Batto, Emily Beaulieu
• Verlagsort: New York, NY
• Verlag: Oxford University Press
• E-Jahr: 2024
• Jahr: [2024]
• Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource
• Gesamttitel/Reihe: Oxford scholarship online : Political Science
• Fussnoten: Includes bibliographical references and index
• ISBN: 978-0-19-774446-8
• DOI: doi:10.1093/oso/9780197744420.001.0001
• Datenträger: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: eng
• Bibliogr. Hinweis: Erscheint auch als : Druck-Ausgabe
• Sach-SW: Politics and Government
• Sach-SW: Politics & government
• K10plus-PPN: 1897426291
• K10plus-PPN:
  Universitätsbibliothek
• Lokale URL UB: Zum Volltext

Abstract

In 'Making Punches Count', a comprehensive account of legislative floor violence and its consequences, Emily Bacchus and Nathan Batto focus on recent episodes from a wide variety of countries, including Turkey, South Korea, Taiwan, Ukraine, Mexico, Uganda, and others. What do cultures of legislative brawling tell us about the health of democracy in a given country? Are the brawls mere fits of passion, or is there a deeper logic at work? Bacchus and Batto argue that legislative brawls are, in fact, calculated acts that serve the interests of the legislators who engage in them. Beginning from the incentives driving lawmakers in different party systems and drawing on both signaling theory and theories of contentious politics, they develop a powerful explanation of why individual legislators choose to brawl.

Abstract

"This book seeks to explain why individual legislators engage in parliamentary brawls. In addition to extensive description of this phenomenon, we offer a political theory of brawling that draws on the logic of contentious politics and signalling theory to explain why individual legislators might brawl in an attempt to further their political careers. We argue that individuals make brawling decisions in a specific institutional context, where the strength of political parties is particularly important for determining the brawler's audience. With research drawn from Taiwan and Ukraine, book chapters follow major implications of our theory including identifying who brawls, establishing that brawling is covered by the media, offering evidence of the audience for brawls, and finally evaluating re-election prospects of brawling legislators. While the bulk of our theory and evidence focus on instances of brawling when opposition parties disrupt, we also discuss a smaller but impactful subset of brawls that we call honor brawls"--