Perceptual knowledge and self-awareness

• Titel: Perceptual knowledge and self-awareness
• Mitwirkende: Giananti, Andrea [HerausgeberIn]
• Mitwirkende: Roessler, Johannes [HerausgeberIn]
• Mitwirkende: Soldati, Gianfranco [HerausgeberIn]
• Verf.angabe: edited by Andrea Giananti, Johannes Roessler, Gianfranco Soldati
• Verlagsort: Oxford
• Verlag: Oxford University Press
• E-Jahr: 2024
• Jahr: [2024]
• Umfang: 1 online resource
• Illustrationen: illustrations.
• Gesamttitel/Reihe: Oxford scholarship online
• Fussnoten: Includes index. - Description based on online resource and publisher information; title from PDF title page (viewed on September 26, 2024)
• ISBN: 978-0-19-196521-0
• DOI: doi:10.1093/9780191965210.001.0001
• Datenträger: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: eng
• Bibliogr. Hinweis: Erscheint auch als : Druck-Ausgabe
• Sach-SW: Philosophy
• Sach-SW: Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge
• K10plus-PPN: 1906925186
• K10plus-PPN:
  Universitätsbibliothek
• Lokale URL UB: Zum Volltext

Abstract

There is a tendency, in contemporary epistemology, to treat 'perceptual knowledge' and 'self-knowledge' as labels for different and largely unconnected sets of philosophical problems. The project of this volume is to bring out how much is to be gained from treating the two topics as, on the contrary, intimately connected. One set of questions that comes into view when we do concerns the sense in which perceptual knowledge, as understood from the first-person perspective, seem to be 'direct'. In a famous passage, Austin contrasted reliance on what we call 'evidence' with the way perceptual experience 'settles' questions. How should we understand the difference? In what sense is perceptual knowledge 'direct', in contradistinction to evidence-based, inferential knowledge? A connected set of issues has to do with the relationship between the epistemic authority of perception and self-consciousness.