Extremists are more confident

• Verfasst von: Heinzelmann, Nora [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Tran, Viet [VerfasserIn]
• Titel: Extremists are more confident
• Verf.angabe: Nora Heinzelmann, Viet Tran
• E-Jahr: 2024
• Jahr: 12 September 2024
• Umfang: 26 S.
• Fussnoten: Gesehen am 27.01.2025
• Titel Quelle: Enthalten in: Erkenntnis
• Ort Quelle: Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., 1930
• Jahr Quelle: 2024
• Band/Heft Quelle: 89(2024), 5, Seite 2031-2056
• ISSN Quelle: 1572-8420
• DOI: doi:10.1007/s10670-022-00616-9
• Datenträger: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: eng
• Sach-SW: Epistemology
• Sach-SW: Experimental philosophy
• Sach-SW: Metacognition
• Sach-SW: Moral beliefs
• Sach-SW: Moral psychology
• Sach-SW: Social deliberation
• K10plus-PPN: 1915637902

Abstract

Metacognitive mental states are mental states about mental states. For example, I may be uncertain whether my belief is correct. In social discourse, an interlocutor’s metacognitive certainty may constitute evidence about the reliability of their testimony. For example, if a speaker is certain that their belief is correct, then we may take this as evidence in favour of their belief or its content. This paper argues that, if metacognitive certainty is genuine evidence, then it is disproportionate evidence for extreme beliefs. In support of the argument, we report findings from five studies with different participant samples, designs, and measures. These studies show that, the more extreme an agent’s belief (positive or negative), the more certain they are about it, and vice versa. This relationship might contribute to moralism, virtue signalling, and polarisation, which in turn may be epistemically and morally problematic. Therefore, we caution against taking metacognitive certainty as genuine evidence.