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| Verfasst von: | Kvanvig, Jonathan L. [VerfasserIn]  |
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| Titel: | Skepticism and Fallibilism |
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| Verf.angabe: | Jonathan L Kvanvig |
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| Verlagsort: | Oxford |
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| Verlag: | Oxford University Press |
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| Jahr: | 2024 |
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| Umfang: | 1 online resource |
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| Gesamttitel/Reihe: | Oxford scholarship online |
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| Fussnoten: | Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources |
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| ISBN: | 978-0-19-892482-1 |
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| Abstract: | There are two common responses to skepticism, the claim that knowledge is non-existent and perhaps also unachievable: to succumb to it, or to dismiss it. Kvanvig shows how to avoid these responses by offering a theoretical development of skepticism, and arguing that epistemic reasoning may nevertheless approximate to the skeptical ideal. |
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| DOI: | doi:10.1093/9780198924821.001.0001 |
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| URL: | Resolving-System: https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198924821.001.0001 |
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| | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198924821.001.0001 |
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| Datenträger: | Online-Ressource |
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| Sprache: | eng |
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| Bibliogr. Hinweis: | Erscheint auch als : Druck-Ausgabe |
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| Sach-SW: | Philosophy |
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| | Philosophy |
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| K10plus-PPN: | 1913511723 |
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| Lokale URL UB: |  Zum Volltext |
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978-0-19-892482-1
Skepticism and Fallibilism / Kvanvig, Jonathan L. [VerfasserIn]; 2024 (Online-Ressource)
69296517
