Trading off autonomy and efficiency in choice architectures

• Verfasst von: Diederich, Johannes [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Goeschl, Timo [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Waichman, Israel [VerfasserIn]
• Titel: Trading off autonomy and efficiency in choice architectures
• Titelzusatz: self-nudging versus social nudging
• Verf.angabe: Johannes Diederich, Timo Goeschl, Israel Waichman
• E-Jahr: 2025
• Jahr: January 2025
• Umfang: 18 S.
• Illustrationen: Illustrationen
• Fussnoten: Gesehen am 12.03.2025 ; Online veröffentlicht: 21. Dezember 2024
• Titel Quelle: Enthalten in: Journal of economic behavior & organization
• Ort Quelle: Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1980
• Jahr Quelle: 2025
• Band/Heft Quelle: 229(2025) vom: Jan., Artikel-ID 106859, Seite 1-18
• ISSN Quelle: 1879-1751
• ISSN Quelle: 0167-2681
• DOI: doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106859
• Datenträger: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: eng
• Sach-SW: Choice architecture
• Sach-SW: CONDITIONAL COOPERATION
• Sach-SW: Defaults
• Sach-SW: FEEDBACK
• Sach-SW: GROUP-SIZE
• Sach-SW: INFORMATION
• Sach-SW: NUDGES
• Sach-SW: Online experiment
• Sach-SW: POWER
• Sach-SW: PROVISION
• Sach-SW: Public goods
• Sach-SW: PUBLIC-GOODS
• Sach-SW: Self-nudge
• Sach-SW: VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS
• K10plus-PPN: 1919606106

Abstract

To overcome ethical objections to choice architecture interventions, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) suggest asking individuals to set their own nudge autonomously. Our online experiment (n=1080) faithfully implements this idea for social dilemmas where individual and collective interests often diverge and social nudges can conflict with autonomy. General-population subjects play a ten-round, ten-day public goods game. Non-participation triggers default contributions. We test three default nudges: An exogenous selfish nudge of zero contribution, an exogenous social nudge of full contribution, and an autonomous self-nudge where subjects select their own default contribution. Their performance is tested under four different information structures. We, first, document default choice under autonomy: Only between three and eight percent of subjects set their own default to either zero or full contribution. Second, autonomy and efficiency conflict: Group-level contributions under self-nudging are consistently lower than under the social nudge, which strictly dominates the selfish nudge. When committed to autonomy, the policy-maker - to maximize efficiency - best combines self-nudging with an information structure with public defaults.