The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council

• Verfasst von: Dreher, Axel [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Gould, Matthew [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Rablen, Matthew D. [VerfasserIn]
• Verfasst von: Vreeland, James Raymond [VerfasserIn]
• Titel: The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council
• Verf.angabe: Axel Dreher, Matthew Gould, Matthew D. Rablen, James Raymond Vreeland
• Jahr: 2014
• Jahr des Originals: 2013
• Umfang: 33 S.
• Fussnoten: Published online: 7 August 2013 ; Gesehen am 03.11.2020
• Titel Quelle: Enthalten in: Public choice
• Ort Quelle: New York, NY : Springer Science+Business Media LLC, 1968
• Jahr Quelle: 2014
• Band/Heft Quelle: 158(2014), Seite 51-83
• ISSN Quelle: 1573-7101
• DOI: doi:10.1007/s11127-013-0096-4
• Datenträger: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: eng
• Bibliogr. Hinweis: Erscheint auch als : Druck-Ausgabe: The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council. - 2014
• K10plus-PPN: 1737630664

Abstract

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perks—election to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans. But who gets elected to the UNSC? Addressing this question empirically is not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete choices at the regional and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the latter ratifies them. Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyze a dataset of 180 elections from 1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving each country its turn. We also find evidence that richer countries from the developing world win election more often, while involvement in warfare lowers election probability. By contrast, development aid does not predict election.